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Social mobility is the engine of the American Dream, and education is the 
key to social mobility. Access to education is therefore, understandably, at the 
heart of many movements, historical and modern, to improve social equality, 
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and the standard of living for the poor.1 Indeed, in the nineteenth century, free, 
public education was “one of the most characteristic of American institutions.”2 
Throughout the twentieth century, the push for improved access to and quality 
of education was a major social force.3 This drive, however, has become stalled 
because the current movement of education adequacy lawsuits has been unable 
to deliver on its promise to ensure a high-quality education for all children. 
This article hypothesizes that the structure of current adequacy lawsuits is 
partly to blame for the as-of-yet failure of the movement. In every case, the 
plaintiffs have been either school districts or large classes of students, with the 
former having been represented about four times more frequently.4 Not 
surprisingly, the remedies requested and then ordered have been on the state or 
district level, and no court has ordered a student-level remedy.5 The structure of 
these suits is also ill-formed to provide actual improvements for plaintiff 
children because the suits take too long and include remedies that are frequently 
too vague, and because courts tolerate non-compliance from the state officials 
charged with implementing the remedy. Therefore, a new, student-centered 
structure is needed to give the adequacy movement a second wind for improving 
the fate of at-risk students. 
Part I reviews the history of educational social movements. Part II 
elaborates on the problems in the structure of adequacy lawsuits. Part III 
explores the legal basis for a private right of action for the inadequate provision 
of educational opportunity under a state’s constitution and explains why such a 
right has not previously been recognized: courts have concluded that there are 
no judicially manageable standards for determining when an individual child’s 
right has been denied.6 
Part IV counters this objection by examining the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as a model for determining when a student’s 
rights are denied. Under the IDEA, students with disabilities are entitled to a 
free, appropriate public education, which, as defined by the courts, is strikingly 
similar to a sound, basic education or a minimally adequate education 
guaranteed under many state constitutions.7 The IDEA provides reasonable 
deference to educational authorities regarding the adequacy of the instructional 
program offered along with judicial review of all aspects of that program.8 
 
 1. See, e.g., JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL HOUSE 150 (Macmillan Co. 1912) (1910) 
(explaining that one of the substantial achievements of Hull House was to show Chicago “that 
education and recreation ought to be extended to immigrants”); Teach For America, Our Nation’s 
Greatest Injustice, http://www.teachforamerica.org/mission/index.htm (last visited May 5, 2009) 
(noting the commitment of more than 20,000 corps members to eliminating subpar academic 
opportunities for children in low-income communities to achieve greater social justice). 
 2. WILLIAM J. REESE, AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FROM THE COMMON SCHOOL TO “NO CHILD 
LEFT BEHIND” 45 (2005) (quoting R.W. DALE, IMPRESSIONS OF AMERICA (1878)). 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Part III.B. Courts have also cited separation of powers concerns and the potential 
flood of litigation coming from recognition of such a right, but the lack of manageable standards is 
the most frequently cited reason for denying recognition. 
 7. See infra Part IV.B. 
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
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Importantly, the IDEA also includes a broad selection of remedies, ranging from 
a revised educational program to compensatory services such as tutoring or 
additional years of schooling, to tuition at private or out-of-district public 
schools.9 Finally, Part V argues for recognition of a private right of action. After 
justifying the right of action as an appropriate student-level remedy, this part 
evaluates the benefits and disadvantages of allowing a private right of action. 
I. HISTORY OF EDUCATION MOVEMENTS 
Three broad social movements in education chart the centrality of education 
to social mobility through U.S. history to greater and lesser degrees of success: 
the common school movement, desegregation, and education adequacy. The 
common school movement began around 1837 when Horace Mann became the 
first state secretary of education in Massachusetts.10 Mann was instrumental in 
pushing for free, locally funded schools offering grades one through eight, 
starting in Boston and reaching throughout Massachusetts.11 In 1852, 
Massachusetts became the first state with a compulsory school attendance law,12 
thus transforming education from an option to an obligation for the state’s 
children.13 The movement spread nationwide and school attendance rates rose 
steadily over the next century. By the early 1900s, most children were receiving 
at least a few years of free education.14 The common school movement was 
largely a success: throughout the twentieth century proportionally more 
American children attended high school than children in any other country,15 
and locally maintained, free, public schools became the norm by mid-century.16 
The success of the common school movement, however, illuminated the 
problems of segregation in southern schools.17 In the early twentieth century, 
schools for black children had only a fraction of the resources white children’s 
schools did.18 For example, in 1930, South Carolina spent eight times as much per 
pupil for white children’s education as for black children’s; in 1929, the ratio in 
Mississippi was nine to one.19 While improving the education of black children 
 
 9. REESE, supra note 2, at 45. 
 10. Id. at 10–11. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Compulsory Attendance Act of 1852, 1852 Mass. Acts 240, §§ 1–2, 4. 
 13. REESE, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
 14. See Claudia Goldin, The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past, 61 
J. ECON. HIST. 263, 266 (2001). 
 15. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCORVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 19 (2003). 
 16. See Goldin, supra note 14, at 265 (noting the virtues of American education as “public 
funding, openness, gender neutrality, local (and also state) control, separation of church and state, 
and an academic curriculum”); id. at 267 (explaining that by the end of World War II, the median 18-
year-old American was a recent high school graduate). 
 17. See REESE, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining how, simultaneous to the rise in common schools in 
the North, laws against educating slaves became commonplace in the South). Segregation or 
exclusion of blacks from public schools was not, however, an exclusively southern phenomenon. See 
id. at 73 (explaining that blacks were often excluded from rural schools in the Midwest and that many 
urban schools in the North were segregated). 
 18. DIANE RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION 1945–1980 121 (1983). 
 19. Id. 
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was certainly not the only, if even the primary, goal of desegregation 
proponents,20 there can be little doubt that it had just that effect.21 Between 1970 
and 1988, the gap in reading scores between white and black students decreased 
by about half.22 During that time period, the percentage of black students 
attending schools with nearly all minority enrollments reached its lowest level to 
date.23 Similarly, intradistrict discrepancies in class size and funding between 
schools decreased dramatically.24 Although some researchers attribute the 
closing test score gap to increased parity in parental education,25 the rise in 
educational attainment by black parents is also related to desegregation efforts 
that opened high schools and colleges to blacks, as well as to affirmative action 
programs that helped them gain admission. Even critics of the view that 
desegregation policy has substantial impact on the test score gap admit that 
likely alternative causes are increased access of minority students to advanced 
classes, decreased discrimination by teachers, and higher expectations for black 
students.26 Certainly, such changes were not mandated by courts the way busing 
was, but they are part of the social change created, at least in part, by the judicial 
pronouncements against racial separation.27 
As the promise of the Equal Protection Clause to achieve substantially equal 
educational opportunity through desegregation waned,28 a third movement 
began. Like the common school movement of the prior century, the push for 
educational adequacy was directed at the least advantaged children in society,29 
 
 20. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 365 (rev. ed. 2004) (recounting Thurgood Marshall’s 
closing argument in the South Carolina desegregation case, Briggs v. Elliott, noting that segregation, 
as an injustice, caused “lasting, not temporary, injury” to the students); see also id. at 380 (noting that 
some advocates thought black students may be better educated in segregated schools where black 
teachers cared deeply about their success). 
 21. Note that whether students perform better in integrated classrooms or schools is an entirely 
different question from whether the end to separate school systems and the accompanying changes in 
schools improved the educational outcomes of minority students. As to the former question, there is 
indeed substantial doubt. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 187 (2004). 
 22. Michael D. Cook & William N. Evans, Families or Schools? Explaining the Convergence in White 
and Black Academic Performance, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 729, 729–30 (2000). From 1973–1990, the gap in math 
scores decreased by a similar proportion. Id. 
 23. CLOTFELTER, supra note 21, at 56 tbl 2.1. 
 24. Cook & Evans, supra note 22, at 730–31. 
 25. David Armor, Why Is Black Educational Achievement Rising?, PUB. INT., Sept. 1992, at 65, 66. 
 26. Cook & Evans, supra note 22, at 750. 
 27. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”). 
 28. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a cross-district 
busing plan designed to remedy metropolitan segregation). 
 29. Compare REESE, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining the motives for the common school 
movement), with William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas 
Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 219 (1990) (noting 
that school financing lawsuits are motivated by a desire to improve education for disadvantaged 
students). 
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yet focused rhetorically on universal standards.30 The drive for educational 
adequacy began in California in the early 1970s when a group of school children 
filed a class action suit against the state superintendent of public instruction 
challenging the unequal funding of schools.31 The movement for improving 
educational opportunity through constitutional litigation hit a significant speed 
bump in 1973 when the Supreme Court, in San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez,32 upheld large disparities in local education funding under rational 
basis review after finding that education is not a fundamental right and that 
poverty is not a suspect classification.33 
State constitutions, however, are flush with education articles that require 
the establishment of common schools or mandate the provision of basic 
education in one form or another.34 Between 1971 and 2007, lawsuits based on 
these articles were filed in forty-five states35 and have focused on two lines of 
argument: equality and adequacy.36 Equality claims, often based on a state’s 
equal protection clause, focus on the substantial disparities in per pupil funding 
between wealthy and poor districts whereas adequacy claims, based on a state’s 
education clause, focus on the quality of the education provided regardless of 
disparities.37 
Adequacy claims have been more successful.38 Challengers have emerged 
victorious in twenty-five states39 and obtained favorable settlements in four 
more.40 In Minnesota,41 Nebraska,42 South Dakota,43 and Wisconsin44 courts 
 
 30. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989) (noting that 
the state’s constitution guaranteed all children the right to an adequate education that prepared them 
for future employment and citizenship). 
 31. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971). Although the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Serrano rested on the federal Equal Protection Clause, the court later 
affirmed the outcome and the reasoning as applied to the California Equal Protection Clause after the 
United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal clause in San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976). 
 32. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 33. Id. at 35. 
 34. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1325, 1343–48 (1992) (cataloging state constitutional provisions). 
 35. William S. Koski, Ensuring an “Adequate” Education for Our Nation’s Youth: How Can We 
Overcome the Barriers?, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 13, 14 (2007). 
 36. Thro, supra note 29, at 225, 233. 
 37. Id. at 229–33. 
 38. See Nat’l Access Network, State by State, http://www.schoolfunding.info/ 
states/state_by_state.php3 (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (explaining the outcomes in all school finance 
cases). 
 39. Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, School Financing Lawsuits: The Way out of the Fog or Just Blowing 
Smoke?, EDUC. L. & POL’Y F., Nov. 2007, at 5 tbl.1, http://www.educationlawconsortium.org/forum/ 
2007/papers/Ralston2007.pdf [hereinafter School Financing Lawsuits]. Because state constitutions, 
state laws, and state courts are all different, of course, it is important to remember that a victory in 
one state does not have exactly the same meaning as a victory in another state. Despite these 
differences though, there are substantial similarities in the holdings of the courts and the challenges 
faced by children which makes comparisons, while undoubtedly broad, helpful. 
 40. See Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38 (explaining settlements in Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, 
and North Dakota). 
 41. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993). 
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found that the state constitution guaranteed some level of adequate education 
but that the state’s current system already met the required level. In some cases, 
defeat in court was not the end of the story. In Oklahoma, the legislature raised 
taxes to fund smaller class sizes and higher teachers’ salaries after education 
advocates sued in the late 1980s even though the state had prevailed in court.45 In 
Florida, after the state supreme court declared that the state constitution did not 
require educational adequacy, in part because there were no judicially 
manageable standards,46 the voters passed an amendment to the state 
constitution making it very clear just how fundamental a right they thought 
education was. 47 
Unlike the two prior movements for educational opportunity, the adequacy 
movement has been less successful thus far in translating legal and policy 
victories into educational ones.48 For example, in several states where courts have 
recognized the unconstitutionality of the current funding system, the judges 
have yet to order specific remedies or enforce mandates for legislatively created 
ones.49 Although it is also true that many courts tasked with implementing 
desegregation were hesitant at first to order or enforce drastic remedies,50 they 
were eventually spurred by the Supreme Court to be more aggressive51 in a way 
that cannot52 and will not53 happen in adequacy cases. Along with reticent 
legislatures, there is evidence that the adequacy movement has not created 
significant improvements for students that would parallel the gains of the 1970s 
 
 42. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993) (upholding the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment because the plaintiffs failed to allege that differential funding led to inadequate education). 
 43. See Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38 (describing the trial court’s decision in Bezdicheck v. 
State in 1994). 
 44. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396–97 (Wis. 2000). 
 45. Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38. 
 46. Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996). 
 47. The first sentence of the education article now reads, “The education of children is a 
fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida.” FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a). 
 48. See Elder, supra note 39, at 2 (explaining that students’ test scores in states with victorious 
lawsuits have not improved significantly more than those in other states). 
 49. See Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, Standing up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of Powers, State 
Courts, and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 785–90 (2007) [hereinafter Standing up to Legislative 
Bullies]. 
 50. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1971) (noting that 
between 1954 and 1968 “very little progress had been made” in integrating schools, in part, because 
the lower federal courts encountered “problems” in designing and enforcing remedies). 
 51. See id. at 15 (noting that “the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past 
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies”). 
 52. Because state high courts have final authority to interpret state constitutions, the Supreme 
Court may not broaden the scope of state courts’ powers to remedy state constitutional wrongs. 
Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (“It is fundamental that state courts be left free 
and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.”). 
 53. The Supreme Court has become increasingly less interested in enforcing educational rights. 
See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1990) (holding that once a school district has reached 
unitary status, the district court’s authority to review the school district’s student assignment policies 
must end); cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that a student’s race may be a factor in student assignment only as 
“a last resort to achieve a compelling interest”). 
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and 80s.54 Combining this lack of improvement with the lack of enthusiasm for 
judicial management of schools, it is likely that, without something more, the 
adequacy movement will wither and die before achieving substantial 
improvements in the educational opportunities of at-risk children. 
II. ADEQUACY LAWSUITS ARE POORLY STRUCTURED 
As a means of ensuring that each child’s right to an adequate education is 
vindicated, educational adequacy and school financing lawsuits are poorly 
structured. The lawsuits have been focused on the macrolevel rather than the 
microlevel, resulting in judgments that take years to enforce and have few, if any, 
trickle-down benefits for individual students in need of better educational 
opportunities. 
Educational adequacy or school financing lawsuits have been brought in 
forty-five states.55 In more than 80 percent of these cases, a school district or 
nonprofit organization was a named plaintiff.56 In the remaining eight cases in 
 
 54. Compare School Financing Lawsuits, supra note 39, at 2 (noting the lack of dramatic 
improvement in the black-white achievement gap due to financing lawsuits), with Cook & Evans, 
supra note 22, at 730 (explaining that the black-white achievement gap narrowed substantially from 
the early 1970s through the mid-1980s). 
 55. Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38. 
 56. See Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (an advisory opinion 
upholding the decision in Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt); Moore v. State, No. 3AN-04-9756 Civ. 
(Alaska Super. Ct. filed Aug. 9, 2004) (plaintiffs include three school districts); Roosevelt Elementary 
Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Lake View Sch. Dist., No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 
S.W.3d 472 (Ark. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 
1996); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1997); Comm. for Educ. 
Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Lake Cent. v. State, No. 56 C01-8704-CP81 (Ind. 1987); 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Charlet v. Legislature, 713 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (plaintiffs included 
six New Orleans parishes and the Orleans Parish School Board); Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r, 
659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Durant 
v. State, 566 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1997) (plaintiffs included fifty-one school districts from Schmidt v. 
State (Docket No. 132677) because the cases were consolidated); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 
(Minn. 1993) (plaintiffs included fifty-two school districts); Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 
S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1994); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, CV-98014-
II (N.M. Dist. Ct., McKinley County Oct. 14, 1999), https://repository.unm.edu/dspace/bitstream/ 
1928/6859/1/ReportSpaecialMasterZuniPubSch.Jan.15%2c2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009); 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006); Hoke County v. State, 599 
S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); DeRolph 
v. State 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (plaintiffs included five school districts); Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. 
State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Coal. for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991); 
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979) (plaintiff was the Philadelphia School District); City of 
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995); Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 
(S.C. 1999); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (plaintiffs 
included two school districts); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (plaintiffs included 
seven school boards); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Vincent v. Voight, 614 
N.W.2d 388 (Wis. 2000) (plaintiffs included school districts); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 
P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995); Coal. for a Common Cents Solution v. State (Iowa 2002), 
http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/legal_docs/Iowa/Coalition__v_Iowa_StateDistrict
Cou.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (case settled shortly after being filed); South Dakota Legislative 
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which all plaintiffs were individual students, the suits were filed as57 or treated 
as58 class actions rather than individual suits. This structure is unsurprising 
considering how expensive lawsuits can be, particularly when expert witnesses 
and multiple appeals will be required.59 School districts, due to their institutional 
capacity, have more available resources, frequently including lawyers on staff. 
The real problem arises during the remedy phase of the case where the 
individual child’s interest in receiving an adequate education immediately, and 
the school district’s interest in self-preservation and promotion or the nonprofit’s 
interest in fixing the system as a whole, diverge. In every successful case, the 
original remedy has been to order the state legislature to reform the school 
financing statute to provide equalized or increased funds at the district level.60 
Yet there is seldom discussion of the wisdom or efficacy of giving more money to 
the entity that ultimately has been unable to provide the adequate education in 
the past. And indeed, the strategy has yet to prove effective: between 1992 and 
2005 there was no statistically significant difference in the improvement in 
student achievement between states with adequacy victories and those without.61 
The questionable efficacy of the monetary remedy implicates an ongoing 
debate in the educational community about whether money matters in 
education.62 Researchers like Eric Hanushek argue that educational outcomes are 
largely independent of financial inputs.63 His methods, however, have been 
sharply critiqued by other researchers in the field.64 The truth likely lies 
 
Research Council, Issue Memorandum 94-39, http://legis.state.sd.us/ IssueMemos/ 
IssueMemos/im94-39.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (describing Bezdichek v. South Dakota, CIV 91-
209 (S.D. 1994) (plaintiffs were school districts)). 
 57. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 
859 (W. Va. 1979). 
 58. Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982) (analyzing whether 
plaintiffs or those “similarly situated” were denied equal protection); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 
1272–73 (Conn. 1996) (examining facts at the level of the school district rather than the specific 
situations of any of the sixteen individual plaintiffs); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157–60 (Ga. 
1981) (analyzing data on the district level); McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 
N.E.2d 516, 549 (Mass. 1993) (examining the structure of school districts in Massachusetts to 
determine if the constitution was followed); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Neb. 1993) (analyzing 
data on the district level even though the case had only two plaintiffs, who were siblings); Abbott v. 
Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 420–21 (N.J. 1997) (analyzing the statute as it applied to the districts not the 
students). 
 59. For example, in 1997, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the award of more than $3 
million in legal expenses to plaintiffs in a school financing case. James v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 713 So. 
2d 937, 950 (Ala. 1997). 
 60. E.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (ordering the legislature to devise an 
entirely new system of education financing with an eye towards how such a system impacts 
discrepancies among districts). 
 61. Elder, supra note 39, at 2. To isolate the effects of the lawsuits on student achievement 
growth, this study controlled for growth in per capita income, growth in per pupil spending, prior 
per pupil spending, and the proportion of education spending provided by the state. Id. at 6. 
 62. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAKING MONEY MATTER: FINANCING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 38–39 
(Helen F. Ladd & Janet S. Hansen eds., 1999). 
 63. E.g., Eric A. Hanushek, Assessing the Effects of School Resources on Student Performance: An 
Update, 19 EDUC. EVAL. & POL’Y ANAL. 141, 141 (1997). 
 64. E.g., Alan B. Krueger, Understanding the Magnitude and Effect of Class Size on Student 
Achievement, in THE CLASS SIZE DEBATE (Lawrence Mishel & Richard Rothstein eds., 2002) (critiquing 
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somewhere in the middle: adequate funds are a necessary but insufficient part of 
providing quality education.65 Although researchers have yet to discover the 
elusive magic formula for educating all students,66 some inputs recur frequently 
enough in studies on quality to conclude that they really do matter. 
For example, studies frequently cite effective or high-quality teachers as the 
most important input in student learning.67 Teacher quality is indeed one of the 
most significant measurable differences between high-income and low-income 
schools and between white and nonwhite schools.68 Experienced teachers 
consistently flee low-achieving, low-income, and, most notably, minority 
majority schools for greener pastures.69 High turnover among teachers creates 
problems in addition to those associated with simply having less-experienced 
and less-qualified teachers: the school becomes unstable, teacher training and 
development suffers because there are no experienced teachers to be mentors or 
they are worn out from doing it year after year, and budgets must be spent on 
recruiting new teachers instead of improving the school or buying instructional 
materials.70 Lower teacher salaries and poorer working conditions are also 
associated with low-achieving schools.71 Yet no court has enforced a requirement 
that every child receive an effective teacher.72 
In more circuitous fashion, many courts have commissioned studies or 
relied on studies commissioned by governors that analyze how much it would 
 
Hanushek’s “vote counting” methodology for over counting weaker studies and misrepresenting the 
consensus of research). 
 65. See Richard J. Murnane & Frank Levy, Evidence from Fifteen Schools in Austin, Texas, in DOES 
MONEY MATTER? THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND ADULT SUCCESS 
93, 93–96 (Gary Burtless ed., 1996) (exploring the impact of increased funds in fifteen schools and 
finding that only two schools—those which used the money to improve teacher training and 
instruction—saw significant gains in achievement). 
 66. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 18 (“Figuring out how to improve learning 
for all students is an evolving story.”); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING 
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 61–83 
(2004) (explaining that even successful interventions for disadvantaged students are not perfectly 
replicable). 
 67. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 210–11 (cataloging studies that show the 
positive impact of high-quality teachers on student achievement). 
 68. See Susana Loeb, John Luczack, & Linda Darling-Hammond, How Teaching Conditions Predict 
Teacher Turnover in California Schools, 80 PEABODY J. EDUC. 44, 48–49 (2005) (explaining the perils for 
students who are taught by inexperienced and under-qualified teachers for several years in a row and 
that such conditions are more likely to occur at high-poverty, high-minority schools). 
 69. Id. at 45. Minority majority schools are those where a majority of the student body is 
comprised of students of color. 
 70. Id. at 48–49. 
 71. Id. at 49 (finding that students in schools with high teacher turnover “experience a number of 
negative consequences” and learn less than they should); id. at 49, 51 (finding that schools with high 
turnover rates have higher rates of new and inexperienced teachers, whose salaries are comparatively 
low); id. at 65 (finding that working conditions are a substantial predictor of teacher turnover). 
 72. North Carolina has come the closest. In 2004, the state supreme court upheld the trial court’s 
determination that a sound basic education includes “‘every classroom be[ing] staffed with a 
competent, certified, well-trained teacher.’” Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 389 
(N.C. 2004) (quoting the trial court’s order). Yet, even in this case, no sanctions have been applied to 
schools that continue to use uncertified teachers or long-term substitutes, a still-common occurrence 
in many rural classrooms. 
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cost to provide a quality education.73 These costing-out studies seek to divine 
how much a good education costs by one of four methods: statistical analysis, 
effective schools, professional judgment, and whole-school design.74 The first 
method utilizes econometrics to identify numerous variables and analyze the 
impact of each variable through statistical models.75 Statistical analysis, however, 
is highly complex and difficult for policymakers (and judges) to understand; it is 
also limited by the difficulty of quantifying all the relevant variables.76 Perhaps 
the most serious flaw of this method is that it relies, in theory, on the existence of 
an education production function—a magic formula—which likely does not 
exist.77 The second method identifies successful or effective schools that have 
high achieving students and low costs and deems their per pupil expenditures 
“adequate.”78 The effective schools method was used in Ohio and Illinois, but it 
fails to control adequately for differences in student statuses such as disability, 
poverty, and speaking English as a second language, as well as cost of living and 
other geographic differences.79 The third method, professional judgment, selects 
a panel of experts who construct an ideal instructional delivery system and then 
assigns a cost to each of the components of that system.80 This method was used 
in Wyoming, and is likely no less precise than the others, although the process is 
less transparent and the results depend greatly on which experts are chosen.81 
The final method, whole-school design, takes off-the-shelf blueprints for model 
schools and determines the cost for implementing them.82 This is likely the 
weakest method because none of the available designs are research tested or 
verified.83 
Additionally, each method suffers from the need to make adjustments for 
the type of students in a given school and the local cost of resources.84 In a study 
for the state of New York, Standard & Poor’s used a common weighting system 
to adjust the results of its effective schools approach: students with disabilities 
were counted as 2.1 students, English-language learners as 1.2, and economically 
disadvantaged students as 1.35.85 Geographic adjustments are more complicated 
but also possible—and necessary: no one disputes that everything is more 
expensive in Manhattan than it is in Albany.86 
 
 73. E.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53–56 (N.Y. 2006). 
 74. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 114. 
 75. Id. at 115–16. 
 76. Id. at 117 (examples of variables that are hard to measure or hard to include in models 
because they are not currently measured include students’ social skills, work readiness, and 
appreciation for cultural diversity). 
 77. Id. at 117–18. 
 78. Id. at 118. 
 79. Id. at 120. 
 80. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 121. 
 81. Id. at 122–23. 
 82. Id. at 123. 
 83. Id. at 124. 
 84. Id. at 124–25. 
 85. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 54 (N.Y. 2006). 
 86. See id. at 54–55. 
Ralston_cxns.doc (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2009 1:38:37 PM 
 ENFORCING PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS 147 
The most serious flaw with each of these methods is that they fail to account 
for the labor market effects of changes in demand for the most costly resource: 
effective teachers. Effective teachers are not a commodity whose price is 
unaffected by supply and demand: as more schools demand effective teachers, 
each school will no longer be able to purchase a sufficient quantity at the pre-
high-demand price. That is, just because a school could hire one effective teacher 
for $40,000 today it does not follow that every school in the state could staff itself 
exclusively with effective teachers for $40,000 a piece. These models, therefore, 
will underpredict the amount of money needed, resulting in insufficient funds 
even if the plan is fully enacted, which it rarely is.87 
Another reason these lawsuits are failing the children they aim to help is 
that they simply take too long. The North Carolina Supreme Court first 
recognized the right to education in 1997.88 In 2007, the case was still active on 
remand.89 In Ohio, the state supreme court held the school funding system 
inadequate in 1997,90 but later abandoned the case without any significant 
changes having been made.91 In New Jersey, the ordeal has dragged on for more 
than three decades without resolve.92 Other states have similar stories.93 By the 
time the remedy is implemented, if it ever is, the children who were the subjects 
of the suit, like Robb Leandro in North Carolina, have grown up without the 
adequate education to which they were entitled.94 
This is reminiscent of the fight for desegregation in which it took nearly ten 
years for southern schools to make measurable progress on integration.95 Just like 
Robb Leandro, the children of Clarendon County, South Carolina, plaintiffs in 
Briggs v. South Carolina never attended integrated schools, and Linda Brown 
attended an integrated high school for a mere two years even though she was 
only seven when Brown v. Board of Education began.96 Much of the progress that 
did come in desegregation likely was prompted by the federal government 
 
 87. See, e.g., Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 791–92 (explaining that while the 
N.Y. Court of Appeals ordered the state to increase spending for N.Y.C. public schools by $1.9 billion 
annually, the actual increase approved by the legislature was only about $900 million). 
 88. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997). 
 89. See Rick Martinez, Schools Change at a Snail’s Pace, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 19, 
2007, at A13. 
 90. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). 
 91. See Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 785–86 (explaining the DeRolph line of 
cases and the lack of change to the status quo ante). 
 92. See id. at 786–89. 
 93. See Nat’l Access Network, supra note 38 (cataloging the ongoing battles over education 
equity and adequacy in all fifty states). 
 94. Indeed, the lead plaintiff in the North Carolina lawsuit, Robb Leandro, was a high school 
student when the case was filed and is now an attorney at the firm that is handling the case on 
remand. Parker Poe, Attorney Profile, Robb A. Leandro, http://www.parkerpoe.com/attorneys/ 
bios.cfm?id=485 (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
 95. CLOTFELTER, supra note 21, at 24, 26 (explaining that in 1959 only 0.2% of black students in 
the South attended school with whites but by 1972 only 25% attended schools that were more than 
90% black). 
 96. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, MSN ENCARTA, http://encarta.msn.com/ 
encyclopedia _761588641/Brown_v_Board_of_Education_of_Topeka.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2007). 
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through the Civil Rights Act of 196497 and the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965,98 which tied federal funding for schools to progress on 
integration.99 In contrast, it is unlikely that Congress will step in to ensure 
adequacy. 
The recent federal effort to improve educational quality, the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB),100 is rhetorically bold, but falls far short of providing 
sufficient resources and guidance to substantially improve education for 
disadvantaged students.101 Like school financing lawsuits, NCLB is focused at 
the school level: schools must make adequate yearly progress for each subgroup 
of students and face sanctions if they fall short.102 Individual students, however, 
are left with few remedies under the law. They are allowed to transfer to other 
schools, but only if those schools are not in need of improvement and are in the 
same school district, conditions that are rarely met at all and certainly not in the 
numbers necessary to provide alternatives for all students in struggling 
schools.103 NCLB, like most federal education efforts, is critically underfunded.104 
Additionally, the law creates incentives for states to lower their standards, 
shuffle low-performing minority students among schools to avoid having to 
count their scores, and encourage truly struggling children to drop out  
altogether.105 
Adequacy lawsuits have been on the scene in serious numbers for more 
than two decades, yet in 2007, eighth graders eligible for the free and reduced-
price lunch program scored three-quarters of a standard deviation below their 
more affluent peers in math and reading on the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress.106 This means that seventy-seven percent of non-poor 
students score higher than the average poor student. These gaps are the same as 
in 1996.107 Clearly, something is not working. 
 
 97. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered 
section of the 42 U.S.C.). 
 98. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 99. CLOTFELTER, supra note 21, at 26. 
 100. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6300 et seq. (2006). 
 101. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 
932–34 (2004). 
 102. Id. at 940. 
 103. Id. at 966–67. In many parts of the country, school districts are geographically small and 
relatively homogeneous in achievement, so a failing school is overwhelmingly likely to be part of a 
failing district. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., David J. Hoff, Debate Grows on True Costs of School Law, EDUC. WK., Feb. 4, 2004, at 1. 
 105. Ryan, supra note 101, at 934. 
 106. Inst. for Educ. Sci., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., http://www.nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/nde 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (click on “Quick Start,” agree to the terms, select radio buttons for “Grade 
8” and either “Mathematics” or “Reading,” click on “National,” and then select “National Public,” 
select “Natl School Lunch Prog eligibility,” click on “Go to Results,” on the next page, select “average 
scale score with standard deviation”). 
 107. Id. (follow the same instructions, except select “all years available” on the criteria selection 
page to get results from 1996). 
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III. THE LEGALITY OF THE RIGHT OF ACTION 
The case for the private right of action for inadequate educational 
opportunity under a state’s constitution is a simple one: the right belongs to the 
student who therefore deserves the opportunity to seek individualized 
enforcement of that right rather than rely on a third party to do so on his or her 
behalf. First, this part includes a discussion establishing the constitutional, 
common law, or statutory basis for the private right of action, which differs 
based on the state. Next follows a discussion examining why such a right has not 
already been recognized. 
A. The Basis for the Private Right of Action 
The private right of action could be based in one of three areas: the state 
constitution itself, a state statute providing for the remedy of constitutional 
violations, or common law principles. Twenty-seven states have direct 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing access to the courts, unbiased justice, and 
remedy by due course of law.108 At least one state court judge has found that 
such a provision gives plaintiffs the ability to assert their state constitutional 
rights in court.109 These provisions essentially make the state constitution self-
enforcing and thus plaintiffs may bring their educational rights claims by 
pleading directly for enforcement of the state’s constitution.110 Second, federal 
statutory law provides a model for many state laws, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows 
citizens to initiate suits at law or in equity to recover when their federal civil and 
constitutional rights have been violated “under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage” of a state.111 Many states have similar provisions 
allowing suits when state constitutional rights have been violated.112 Because 
educational rights are state constitutional rights, suits seeking to enforce those 
rights fit squarely within the parameters of these civil rights statutes. 
Third, the common law provides an analogy for a private right of action for 
constitutional violations through the similar implied rights of action recognized 
for the enforcement of statutes. In 1975, through the case Cort v. Ash, the 
Supreme Court laid out a four-factor test for determining if a federal statute 
implied a private right of action.113 The factors were: 1) whether the plaintiff is a 
member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; 2) legislative 
intent; 3) consistency with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and 
 
 108. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art 1, § 19. 
 109. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 1993) (White, J., dissenting in part) (calling 
plaintiff’s right to be heard in court “readily apparent”). While courts in forty-five states have heard 
challenges to school financing statutes on constitutional grounds, few of those decisions explain 
under what statute or provision plaintiffs properly stated their claims. But, the same route that 
provides a school district with third-party standing and a cause of action in those suits should 
provide a cause of action to an individual plaintiff. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 112. E.g., 16-123-105 ARK. CODE (Weil 2007) (mirroring the language of § 1983); accord NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 20-148 (2007). 
 113. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
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4) whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law.114 Many state 
courts apply a version of the Cort test.115 In 2001, the Supreme Court abandoned 
that test, holding in Alexander v. Sandoval that private rights of action “must be 
created by Congress.”116 The Court’s reasoning was based largely on the fact that 
while “[r]aising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be 
a proper function for common-law courts,” it is inappropriate for federal courts 
that do not have common law powers.117 Because state courts, unlike federal 
courts, are common law courts, the states that followed Cort have not yet 
followed Sandoval and their Cort-style tests remain good law. 
For example, West Virginia uses a nearly identical four-factor test where the 
first three factors are the same as in Cort and the fourth inquires as to whether 
the private right of action would intrude on an area of exclusively federal law.118 
In another variation, Illinois courts consider whether: 
(1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was 
enacted, 2) it is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute, (3) 
plaintiff’s injury is one the Act was designed to prevent, and (4) it is 
necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute.119 
Kansas courts apply a similar two-part test considering whether 1) the 
statute was designed “to protect a specific group of people rather than . . . the 
general public,” and 2) the private right of action was intended by the 
legislature.120 In contrast, Arizona courts assume a private right of action exists 
unless the legislature has shown explicit intent to prohibit it.121 
Collectively, then, there are six possible factors: 1) whether the right inures 
to a specific class of which the plaintiff is a member; 2) whether the injury in 
question is the type the provision was designed to prevent; 3) whether the issue 
is preempted by federal law; 4) whether the cause of action is consistent with the 
purpose of the provision; 5) whether the cause of action is necessary to remedy 
the violations; and 6) the intent of the drafters or the purpose of the act. 
In applying these tests to the right to adequate educational opportunity, 
some factors are easier than others. First, as free public education is only 
available to schoolchildren, education articles in state constitutions are aimed at a 
particular class: children. In fact, some articles specifically mention children as 
the benefactors of the right.122 Individual students would be members of that 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Noyola v. Bd. of Educ., 688 N.E.2d 81, 85 (Ill. 1997). 
 116. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 
 117. Id. at 287 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
 118. United Steelworkers v. Tri-State Greyhound Park, 364 S.E.2d 257,260 (W. Va. 1987). 
 119. Noyola, 688 N.E.2d at 85. 
 120. Nichols v. Kan. Pol. Action Comm., 11 P.3d 1134, 1143 (Kan. 2000). 
 121. Hayes v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 672 (Ariz. 1994). 
 122. See N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“A uniform system of free public schools sufficient for the 
education of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be established and 
maintained.”); VT. CONST. § 68 (requiring that “a competent number of schools ought to be 
maintained in each town . . . for the convenient instruction of youth”); WASH. CONST. art IX, § 1 (“It is 
the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of the children . . . .”). 
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class. Second, because education is a positive right, the inadequate provision of 
educational opportunity is precisely the harm that providing a right to education 
is designed to prevent.123 Third, education is not an area of law delegated to the 
federal government.124 Fourth, allowing a private right of action is consistent 
with the purpose of a state’s education clause if the constitutional provision is 
designed to ensure the provision of an adequate education and if the cause of 
action is a means of ensuring such provision in practice.125 Fifth, the question of 
whether such a cause of action is necessary to remedy violations of the right is a 
factual inquiry that could be supported by substantial evidence that other 
remedies have proven insufficient. Sixth, the intent of the drafters is the most 
difficult factor to apply as it is historically unclear whether private rights of 
action for enforcement of constitutional rights were even cognizable to the 
drafters of state constitutions. This difficulty, however, should not stop state 
courts from undertaking the analysis. 
B. Why Courts Do Not Already Recognize the Right 
In the past, students and their parents have attempted to sue school districts 
for personal remedies under two different theories: educational malpractice and 
constitutional claims for vouchers. In nearly every instance, the cases have been 
dismissed at the pleadings stage because the courts were unwilling to delve into 
the policy problems of adjudicating such cases.126 
The first educational malpractice case surfaced in 1976 when an eighteen-
year-old high school graduate sued his school district for failing to teach him to 
read above the fifth-grade level.127 The court dismissed his negligence claim 
because he failed to establish that the school district owed him a duty.128 It stated, 
“[u]nlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom methodology 
affords no readily acceptable standards of care, cause, or injury.”129 The court 
also cited policy concerns about the potential flood of litigation that would 
 
 123. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999) (explaining that positive rights are those that entitle persons to 
receive some benefit from the government and that such rights are common in state constitutions). 
 124. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 5 (“Education is not mentioned in the federal 
Constitution and therefore has been viewed as a power reserved to the states . . . .”). 
 125. E.g., Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 173 (Ala. 1993) (explaining that the 
legislative history of the state’s education clause shows that the clause was designed to “accord[] 
schoolchildren of the state the right to a quality education that is generous in its provision and that 
meets minimum standards of adequacy”). 
 126. See Greg D. Andres, Comment, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 795, 803 (1995) (discussing both of the cases in which students sued for vouchers and the cases 
were dismissed); Kimberly Walters-Parker, Note, When Students Pass, but Schools Fail: The Negligent 
Failure to Teach Students to Read, EDUC. L. & POL’Y F., Nov. 2007, at 11–12, http:// 
www.educationlawconsortium.org/forum/2007/papers/Walters-Patker2007.pdf (sic) (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2009) (cataloging educational malpractice suits and their high rate of dismissal). 
 127. See Walters-Parker, supra note 126, at 11–12 (relating the factual background of Peter W. v. 
San Francisco Unified School District, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976)). 
 128. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1976). 
 129. Id. at 860. 
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follow recognition of educational malpractice as a cause of action.130 The Peter W. 
court’s reasoning has been recurrent in subsequent educational malpractice 
cases,131 none of which have been successful.132 
In 1992, the Washington, D.C.-based Institute for Justice filed two 
lawsuits—one in Chicago and the other in Los Angeles—seeking vouchers for 
students attending poorly performing, low-income, inner-city schools, which 
were alleged to be violating each state’s constitution.133 Both state courts 
dismissed the cases, finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action or 
request relief within the court’s power to grant.134 The Illinois court opined that 
even if it were to recognize that the schools are constitutionally inadequate, 
vouchers were a “political question that should be decided in the public 
arena.”135 Similarly, the California court found that decisions about the allocation 
of school funds were for the legislature.136 
In sum, courts’ concerns come down to three areas, none of which should be 
persuasive: separation of powers, the flood of litigation, and the lack of judicially 
manageable standards. The first objection fundamentally misunderstands the 
separation of powers doctrine.137 First of all, the separation of powers doctrine 
developed in the federal courts on the basis of Article III’s structural delegation 
of power to the courts and the overall structure of the federal Constitution.138 As 
such, it is not wholly, and perhaps not even partially, applicable to state courts 
interpreting state constitutions.139 In contrast to federal constitutional rights, 
which are largely negative in structure,140 many state constitutional rights, 
including the right to education, are positively structured.141 The amount of 
judicial intervention required to enforce and uphold positive rights is greater 
than that required to enforce negative ones because injunctions alone usually will 
not suffice.142 By including these positive rights, state constitutions “explicitly 
engage state courts in substantive areas that have historically been outside the 
Article III domain”143 by requiring “state court[s] to share explicitly in public 
governance, engaging in the principled dialogue that commentators traditionally 
 
 130. Id. at 861 (noting that recognizing such a claim would “expose [schools] to the tort claims—
real or imagined—of disaffected students and parents in countless numbers”). 
 131. Walters-Parker, supra note 126, at 12. 
 132. Id. at 3. This article tracks cases through 2006. Id. The author was unable to locate any 
additional cases post-dating this analysis. 
 133. Press Release, Institute for Justice, “Voucher” Remedy Sought for Low-Income Parents in 
Major Lawsuits Filed against Chicago and Los Angeles Public Schools (June 9, 1992), http:// 
www.ij.org/schoolchoice/chicago/6_9_92pr.html. 
 134. Andres, supra note 126, at 796 nn.2–3. 
 135. Jenkins v. Leininger, No. 92 CH 05578, slip op. at 14 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County Mar. 30, 1993). 
 136. Andres, supra note 126, at 803. 
 137. Standing up to Legislatice Bullies, supra note 49 (discussing the misunderstandings of the 
separation of powers doctrine). 
 138. Id. at 759. 
 139. Id. at 759–60. 
 140. Id. at 760. 
 141. Id. at 760–61. 
 142. Id. at 761. 
 143. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1890 (2001). 
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associate with the common law resolution of social and economic issues.”144 
Furthermore, nearly all state courts are common law courts whose business it is 
to craft as well as to apply the law.145 Therefore, state courts enforcing state 
constitutional rights should not be preoccupied with the separation of powers.146 
Second, although recognition of the private right of action would open the 
courthouse doors to more litigation, courts are unlikely to be flooded.147 
Furthermore, as Justice Harlan noted in a similar context, “[t]here is, however, 
something ultimately self-defeating about this argument.”148 It is true that 
judicial resources are stretched thin.149 But lawyers will lack the incentive to 
bring numerous suits in which the possibility of recovery is speculative, so 
concerns about a flood of frivolous lawsuits are unfounded.150 And if the suits 
brought are meritorious, it is counterintuitive to decrease access to the courts for 
those claimants who have been most wronged.151 For example, a company 
should not be allowed to escape accountability through litigation because it 
manufactured a product that killed many people rather than merely a few. 
Indeed, the opposite is true: when a defendant has wronged a large number of 
people, the need for deterrence through civil judgment is at its highest.152 
Moreover, a wholesale closing of the courthouse doors represents a value 
judgment on the part of the judiciary as to which types of claims and legally 
protected interests are important and which are not.153 Certainly the rights of 
impoverished children are just as important as those of traffic accident victims 
and “stockholders defrauded by misleading proxies.”154 The “current limitations 
upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies 
should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise 
 
 144. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1999). 
 145. Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 762–63. 
 146. Id. at 760. 
 147. See Walters-Parker, supra note 126, at 13–14 (explaining that while many courts have cited the 
“flood of litigation” rationale for denying educational malpractice claims, no court has presented 
evidence to support this claim); see also infra Part IV.C (explaining the obstacles to litigation that 
would prevent a flood of lawsuits). 
 148. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining why fears of a flood of litigation were insufficient 
to persuade him that individuals should not have a right of action for damages against federal agents 
for violations of their constitutional rights). 
 149. See, e.g., Tyeesha Dixon, Courts Short of Timeliness Goals, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 3, 2007, at 1B 
(noting that most of Maryland’s courts fell short of 2001 goals to complete civil cases in eighteen 
months and criminal cases in six months due to overcrowding of the docket). 
 150. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS §12 (4th ed. 1971) (“It is the 
business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood of litigation,’ 
and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief on such 
grounds.”). 
 153. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411. 
 154. Id. at 410; see also id. (explaining that if damages are available for at least the “most flagrant 
abuses of official power,” the issue of whether damages should be available in any given case is 
resolved by reference to how important the social value upheld by the law in question is). 
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sound constitutional principles.”155 Regardless of how frequently individuals 
actually seek relief in court, “it is important, in a civilized society, that the 
judicial branch of the Nation’s government stand ready to afford a remedy in 
these circumstances.”156 Part IV deals with the third argument regarding 
judicially manageable standards by presenting a model of manageable 
standards. 
IV. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT AS A MODEL 
In 1975, Congress first passed the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act157 (EAHCA) that guaranteed every U.S. child access to the public schools or 
to be otherwise provided with educational opportunities.158 Before the enactment 
of the EAHCA, eight million children with disabilities were not receiving 
accessible instruction, including one million children who were excluded from 
public schools all together.159 In 1990, Congress substantially amended the law, 
retitling it the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).160 The IDEA, 
in both its original and amended forms, provides students with disabilities with 
procedural and substantive rights to education and has been effectively enforced 
by state and federal courts for more than three decades. As such, it provides an 
apt model for a more generalized private right of action to enforce the existing 
state constitutional rights to an adequate education. Section A provides an 
overview of the law and its function; section B elaborates on the fit between the 
IDEA and state constitutional rights; section C examines the practical aspects of 
the proposed private right of action. 
A. What the IDEA Is and How It Works 
From the beginning, the EAHCA aimed to provide each eligible child with a 
“free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related 
services designed to meet their unique needs.”161 To achieve this goal, the 
EAHCA required schools to create individualized education programs (IEPs) for 
each student that included the student’s current level of performance and annual 
goals, the specific program to be provided, and criteria for evaluation.162 To 
protect the child’s right, it provided parents with the right to be involved in the 
process of developing the IEP,163 to access the child’s records,164 to receive an 
independent evaluation of the child’s needs,165 and to submit complaints.166 
 
 155. Id. at 411. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et. seq. (2006)). 
 158. Id. § 3(a), 89 Stat. at 775 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2006)). 
 159. Id. § 3(a), 89 Stat at 774. 
 160. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (2006) (stating that “this chapter may be cited as the ‘Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act’”). 
 161. Id. § 1400(d)(1). 
 162. Id. § 1414(d). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. § 1415(b)(1). 
 165. Id. 
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Complaints must be adjudicated in an impartial due process hearing and parents 
may appeal the result of that hearing in a civil action in state or federal court.167 
The 1990 amendments included requiring transition plans for students over 
sixteen,168 implementing an evaluation program of the law,169 and perhaps most 
importantly, requiring a waiver of state sovereign immunity for suits alleging 
failure to comply with the IDEA.170 The IDEA makes clear that all remedies 
available “at law or in equity” are open to plaintiffs against states and local 
school boards171 alike172 and authorizes the recovery of attorneys’ fees for the 
winning party.173 
Although the IDEA is a statutory scheme, courts have been active in 
developing its scope and implementation and have explicated or created many of 
the details of its workings. Its definition of a free appropriate public education 
(FAPE) “tends toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive”174 and 
required judicial clarification.175 In Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme 
Court constructed a constrained definition of a FAPE, holding that the IDEA 
does not require states to provide students with the “opportunity to achieve 
[their] full potential.”176 A school provides a FAPE when it “provid[es] 
personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to 
benefit educationally from that instruction.”177 To satisfy the standard, however, 
the educational benefit must be more than de minimis.178 
The Supreme Court has also clarified procedural elements of the IDEA. For 
example, in 2006, the Court held that although the IDEA authorizes the 
prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees, it does not entitle parents 
to recover the costs of experts they used at trial.179 Additionally, as in nearly all 
civil litigation, the plaintiffs, who are always the parents in IDEA cases, bear the 
burden of persuasion180 even though the school, by virtue of being the 
designated record-keeper under the statute, bears the burden of production.181 
 
 166. Id. § 1415(b)(6). 
 167. Id. § 1415(f). 
 168. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 602(a), 104 
Stat. 1103, 1103–04 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (2006)). 
 169. Id. § 203, 104 Stat. 1112 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1418 (2006)). 
 170. Id. § 604, 104 Stat. 1106 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1403 (2006)). Note that IDEA, as a 
grant program to the states, is enacted under Congress’s spending power. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411. 
 171. The statutory text references local education agencies (LEAs), which are defined to include 
school boards. 20 U.S.C. §1401(19)(A). 
 172. See id. § 1415 (referring consistently to “local education agency” or “state agency” as the 
party responsible for complying with procedures and against whom redress may be sought). 
 173. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 
 174. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982). 
 175. See id. at 190. 
 176. Id. at 186 (quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
 177. Id. at 203. 
 178. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 179. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2006). 
 180. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005). 
 181. Id. at 53 (listing the statute’s requirement that schools provide parents with all records upon 
request); see also id. at 56 (noting that the parties agreed that who bears the burden of production was 
not in question). 
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Finally, parents may proceed pro se in actions to enforce the IDEA requirements 
because the statute provides rights to parents as well as to children.182 
Courts have also been instrumental in defining the remedies available for 
violations of the IDEA. Broadly, the statute authorizes a court to “grant such 
relief as [it] determines is appropriate.”183 Courts may use their “broad 
discretion,” taking into account “all relevant factors.”184 The Supreme Court has 
upheld remedies for specific performance185 as well as monetary 
compensation.186 Lower courts have also ordered a broad range of remedies from 
sign language interpreters187 to enrollment at private, residential facilities.188 For 
children with more minor disabilities like specific learning disabilities or mild 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, less drastic remedies like tutoring, 
summer school, and additional years of instruction are common.189 
In evaluating IDEA claims, the trial court should undertake a two-step 
inquiry.190 The first step is determining whether the state complied with the 
procedural requirements of the Act.191 The second step is evaluating whether the 
child’s IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits.”192 If the court finds the state lacking in the second area, it then 
considers the parents’ proposed alternative placement to determine whether that 
placement is “proper under the Act.”193 The alternative placement need not meet 
all the same requirements as the placement proposed by the state,194 but it must 
meet the basic “reasonably calculated” standard.195 
The goal of the EAHCA/IDEA was to ensure disabled children the 
opportunity to benefit from public education.196 With more than thirty years of 
experience, the statute can be judged a success. Before the enactment of the 
EAHCA, more than half of the nation’s eight million children with disabilities 
were not receiving proper instruction, including one million who were excluded 
 
 182. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 534 (2007). 
 183. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (2006). 
 184. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993). 
 185. See, e.g., Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (requiring a school to 
provide clean intermittent catheterization, a simple medical procedure, to a handicapped child in 
school to enable her to remain in school). 
 186. Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (recognizing reimbursement of private 
school tuition as an appropriate remedy for failure to provide a FAPE). 
 187. E.g., Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 114 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 188. E.g., Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1122 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 189. See, e.g., W.G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1482 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 190. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 206–07. 
 193. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993). If the state has violated the 
procedural requirements of the Act, the inquiry is more complex. Before evaluating the alternative 
placement, the court must determine that the procedural violation resulted in a denial of educational 
benefits. See, e.g., Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 764 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 194. Carter, 510 U.S. at 13. 
 195. Id. at 11. 
 196. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2006). 
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from schools all together.197 In the 2004 reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress 
noted that the Act “has been successful in ensuring children with disabilities . . . 
access to a free appropriate public education and in improving educational 
results for children with disabilities.”198 Even though there have been thousands 
of lawsuits filed under the IDEA over the past several decades,199 the fact that 
millions of children have been helped by the law indicates that it effectively 
leveraged the threat of litigation to ensure that every child’s rights are upheld. 
This concept of effective leverage is not unique to the IDEA—indeed, the entire 
American tort system rests on the principle of liability as a deterrent.200 
The Supreme Court has been frank that the main way for schools to avoid 
IDEA liability and being forced to reimburse parents for pricey private school 
tuition is to simply “give the child a free appropriate public education in a public 
setting.”201 
B. The IDEA as a Model for a Private Right of Action in Education 
Because courts routinely evaluate the adequacy of the educational program 
offered in an IEP, IDEA litigation provides a model for establishing judicially 
manageable standards for adjudicating the state constitutional right to education 
in individual cases. This is true largely because the substantive standards are 
similar. It is also not uncommon for state tort causes of action to be based, at least 
in part, on the violation of a duty created by a federal statute or regulation, even 
when there is no independent federal cause of action.202 
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Kentucky became the first court to 
thoroughly elaborate the substance of the right to education by laying out seven 
areas in which children should attain proficiency: 
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to 
function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; 
(ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable 
the student to make informed choices; 
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the 
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and 
nation; 
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and 
physical wellness; 
 
 197. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3(a), 89 Stat 773, 
774. This finding is no longer codified in the U.S.C., having been replaced by more current factual 
findings. 20 U.S.C. § 1400. 
 198. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 
Stat. 2647, 2649 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3)). 
 199. See LEXIS, Federal and State Court Cases, Combined, search between January 1, 1990, and 
December 31, 2007, with the terms “Individuals with Disabilities Education Act” at least five times 
(returning 1,265 cases). 
 200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c (1977). 
 201. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993). 
 202. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986). 
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(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his 
or her cultural and historical heritage; 
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either 
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue 
life work intelligently; and 
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school 
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, 
in academics or in the job market.203 
In subsequent years, the Rose decision has been cited by other states’ high 
courts in determining the scope and content of their own state’s constitutional 
right to education.204 Other state courts have laid out similar, although slightly 
different, formulations of the right.205 Two aspects common to nearly all 
formulations are 1) basic literacy and numeracy skills, and 2) skills necessary to 
prepare the student for independent living and the job market.206 
In a similar vein, a FAPE often consists of basic academic skills, life skills, 
and job preparation.207 Part of the statutory definition of a FAPE is that the 
education must “meet the standards of the State educational agency,”208 which 
include basic academic skills. Additionally, the IDEA requires that the IEPs for 
all students aged sixteen and older include a section on transitioning to life after 
high school including a focus on “training, education, employment, and, where 
appropriate, independent living skills.”209 
One difference of note is that a FAPE is focused on the specific child’s 
individual needs whereas the constitutional provisions are set forth in universal 
terms. But there is reason to believe that the specialized learning needs of 
children with certain developmental or cognitive disabilities are not that 
different from the needs of children growing up in poverty—those most likely to 
 
 203. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212–13 (Ky. 1989). 
 204. E.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (citing the Rose 
factors “as establishing general, aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy”); accord 
McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993). 
 205. E.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (holding that a sound basic education 
consists of “(1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a sufficient 
knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable the student to function in a 
complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient fundamental knowledge of geography, history, 
and basic economic and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices with regard 
to issues that affect the student personally or affect the student's community, state, and nation; (3) 
sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in post-
secondary education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable 
the student to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal education or gainful 
employment in contemporary society”). 
 206. See Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 406 (Wis. 2000) (“An equal opportunity for a sound 
basic education is one that will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them to succeed 
economically and personally.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 181–82 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(discussing how the legislative history of EAHCA demonstrates the Act’s focus on fostering self-
sufficiency and independence in handicapped children both to promote their dignity and because it is 
a good investment in the nation’s future). 
 208. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(B) (2006). 
 209. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(aa). 
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be denied a constitutionally adequate education.210 New research indicates that 
children “from lower socioeconomic levels show brain physiology patterns 
similar to someone who actually had damage in the frontal lobe,” with slower 
reaction time to informational stimuli and hampered problem-solving skills.211 
Not only are the aspirational terms of the rights embodied in state 
constitutions similar to those in the IDEA, but the needs of the children to be 
served under each scheme are also strikingly similar. Because the reasoning 
employed by a court determining the statutory adequacy of an IEP could be 
applied essentially unchanged by one determining the constitutional adequacy of 
the child’s instructional program, the IDEA provides a solid model of judicially 
manageable standards for the adjudication of a private right of action for 
educational rights. 
C. The Private Right of Action in Action 
This section explores some of the more practical elements of the private 
right of action. Although this section attempts to deal with some of the logistical 
issues that will arise when individual educational adequacy cases are brought, 
addressing these logistical issues is by no means the purpose of this piece. The 
overarching goal here remains to provide a sound doctrinal foundation for 
private suits and not to work out the details of individual cases. This is because 
the details of tort law vary significantly by state so it is difficult to make uniform 
statements about procedure, and also because the details are largely irrelevant to 
the larger point. Whether private suits should go forward, both as a matter of 
normative policy and of descriptive doctrine, has little to do with how long the 
pleading period is or what defenses will be recognized. Nonetheless, because 
practical objections can stand in the way of accepting the theoretical point, I 
attempt to address some of the most common practical issues below. I address 
these elements in three categories: pleadings, defenses, and potential alternatives 
to court. 
1. Pleadings 
In educational rights suits, as in any civil suit, the plaintiff must select the 
proper defendant, time the claim so that it is ripe, decide whether a class action is 
an efficient way to press a claim, and meet the burden of proof. First, there are 
two possible defendants in these suits: the state and the school district.212 The 
state has the obligation to fulfill the constitutional right, whereas the district is 
the entity that has failed to provide the adequate education and that holds the 
 
 210. See Mark M. Kishiyama et al., Socioeconomic Disparities Affect Prefrontal Function in Children, 21 
J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE (forthcoming 2009) (explaining how the low-income environment can be 
damaging to the neural development of children). 
 211. Press Release, Robert Sanders, Univ. Cal. Berkeley, EEGs Show Brain Differences Between 
Poor and Rich Kids (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/ 
2008/12/02_cortex.shtml. 
 212. In some states, there is no choice to make. For example, in Hawaii, there are no local school 
districts, only a state education agency. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., About Us, http:// 
doe.k12.hi.us/about/index.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2008). Also, in some other states school districts 
are treated as an arm of the state. See, e.g., Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 253 
(9th Cir. 1992) (“Under California law, school districts are agents of the state . . . .”). 
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records needed to prove the case. Also, from a systemic point of view, suing 
already cash-strapped school districts is somewhat counter-productive and will 
only siphon funds away from other children in need. For these suits to function 
as a lever for systemic change, the financial hurt must be felt at the state level 
because it is the state, not the locality, that has the ability to raise additional 
revenue.213 Therefore, it makes sense to sue both the local school district and the 
state: the district is liable because they took on the state duty to educate by 
accepting state funds and the state is liable either because the fulfillment of 
constitutional rights cannot be delegated or because it failed to provide adequate 
resources for the district to fulfill its commitment. 
Second, education is a continuous process, which makes it difficult to know 
when a claim accrues for the failure to educate. The remedies outlined above are 
all compensatory and educational in nature and thus will have the greatest 
impact for a child early on in his or her educational career. Defendants, however, 
may argue that a claim is not ripe until the school has had every opportunity to 
correct for the child’s underperformance. In borderline cases, ripeness will be 
difficult to resolve. As a starting point, however, there are numerous cases that 
could be brought alleging per se violations of educational rights based on 
inadequate inputs. For example, a child who is not provided a certified, trained, 
or otherwise qualified teacher would have a claim for inadequate provision of 
education in the states where a high-quality teacher has been identified as a 
component of the constitutional right.214 Furthermore, the IDEA can again serve 
as a guide here: it requires a child’s progress be assessed annually and a new IEP 
provided each year—each IEP can be challenged for its adequacy.215 Similarly, 
states could treat each school year as a separate claim under the state 
constitution. A shorter period might not provide the school long enough to 
provide education or monitor the child’s progress. A longer period risks making 
it difficult to determine what happened due to lost records and faded memories 
as well as a compound effect of inadequate education. 
Third, although I argue above that statewide class action suits are ill-suited 
to serve children’s needs, genuine class actions or suits with multiple plaintiffs 
could be beneficial to plaintiffs, defendants, and courts alike. Consider the 
situation noted above where a child has an unqualified teacher. In a state where 
this violates the rights of child A, it also violates the rights of child A’s 
classmates. Were these twenty or thirty children to join together in a single 
lawsuit, it would be easier for them to find counsel willing to take their case, 
cheaper for the defendants to defend one case instead of many, and less strain on 
the court system to hear the consolidated case. Unlike in the typical school 
financing suits, this situation would satisfy the rules of class actions because the 
facts, law, and defenses are all “common to the class.”216 When a class exists that 
 
 213. Low-wealth school districts often have no option to raise additional revenue because 
property tax rates are capped by state law and the districts with the lowest tax bases are often already 
taxing themselves at the highest tax rates. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 62, at 234–38. 
 214. E.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). 
 215. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006). 
 216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
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meets the standards of the state’s class action rules, plaintiffs should able to 
pursue their cases under those rules. 
Finally, the burden of proof issue is relatively straightforward: as in a 
typical civil action, the plaintiff would bear the burden of persuasion; that is, 
they must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the school, district, or 
state failed to fulfill its duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education. 
But one small caveat to the general civil scheme seems in order: as in IDEA cases, 
the school should bear the burden of production because it is the custodian of the 
educational records at issue.217 
2. Defenses 
There are three particularly relevant defenses that might be raised in 
educational adequacy suits. First, as in many lawsuits against a state 
government, the defendants are likely to raise sovereign immunity as a complete 
defense to monetary liability. There are two tactics plaintiffs can use to defeat 
this objection. First, because sovereign immunity does not protect the state from 
the judgment of liability but only from having to pay money damages, plaintiffs 
can avoid sovereign immunity problems by asking for non-monetary remedies 
such as specific performance.218 Some remedies, including those most important 
in educational rights cases, like compensatory education, are considered non-
monetary even though they involve the state expending financial resources.219 
Additionally, they can sue the state official responsible for protecting or ensuring 
their constitutional rights, such as the state superintendent of public instruction 
or the governor, rather than the state itself.220 Second, many states waive their 
sovereign immunity protections for the purposes of enforcing state constitutional 
rights through state statute221 or in the constitution itself.222 If the plaintiffs are in 
a jurisdiction with such a statute, sovereign immunity will not be a valid defense. 
The second category of defense likely to be raised in an educational rights 
suit is contributory or comparative negligence.223 Because these suits are 
essentially constitutional torts, this traditional tort defense is entirely proper. 
Indeed, a state that can show it has offered a child a constitutionally adequate 
education but the child failed to learn because, for example, he did not attend 
school for much of the year, should not be liable. A trickier question arises 
regarding whether it is the child or the parent whose comparative negligence the 
 
 217. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2006) (stating that parents have a right to examine all records 
relating to their children); see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (noting that the parties and 
the Court agreed that who bears the burden of production is not up for debate). 
 218. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). 
 219. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289–90 (1977). 
 220. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 221. See, e.g., Stephen v. Denver, 659 P.2d 666, 667 (Colo. 1983) (explaining the Colorado 
Governmental Immunity Act, which waives immunity for various types of torts). 
 222. E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 21 (“The legislature shall establish procedures for suits against 
the State.”). 
 223. Most states now follow the comparative negligence doctrine under which a defendant will be 
liable for damages in proportion to its share of the liability even if the plaintiff contributed to the 
injury. Only Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia retain the 
contributory negligence doctrine, which bars recovery when a plaintiff has contributed to his injury 
in any way. 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 956 (2008). 
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court should consider, an issue that may vary by state based on principles of 
parental rights and state statutory law regarding truancy and other policies. 
The third likely defense comes from the public duty doctrine. This doctrine 
states that when the government owes a duty to the public in general, it is not 
liable to any one individual for a breach of that duty.224 Originally developed to 
protect the police from claims of negligent failure to arrest, the doctrine 
expanded to cover all municipal functions such as fire protection, road 
construction, and health and safety inspections of workplaces and restaurants.225 
The doctrine is now one of state law and had largely fallen out of favor, but 
remains valid in some states.226 Depending on how a state’s right to education is 
framed, the public duty doctrine may seem to apply.227 
Generally, the doctrine does not apply if the government owes a special 
duty to the individual or if there is a special relationship between the individual 
and the state.228 Both of these exceptions could apply in the educational rights 
context. First, once a state court has determined that the right to education is an 
individual right,229 it has established that the state owes a special duty to each 
individual child. Second, a special relationship exists where the governmental 
entity undertakes, for example, to protect the plaintiff.230 The doctrine is 
designed to protect the government from liability towards those whose only 
relationship with the government is as citizens.231 Students, however, are far 
from strangers to their schools. Indeed, the government has undertaken a very 
special relationship to the students: that of educator, caretaker, and de facto 
parent.232 The failure to educate does create generalized harm to the community, 
for example, in terms of a less prepared workforce and higher crime rates, but it 
is not this generalized harm that individual education adequacy suits seek to 
remedy. Rather, as in standing doctrine, it is the concrete and specific harm to the 
individual student that, although generalized across a class of students, is unique 
 
 224. South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 402–03 (1855). See generally Shea Sullivan, Note, 
City of Rome v. Jordan: Georgia is a Public Duty Doctrine Jurisdiction with No Waiver of Sovereign 
Immunity - A Good “Call” by the Supreme Court, 45 MERCER L. REV. 533, 535–38 (1993). 
 225. E.g., Ryan Rich, Seeing Through the Smoke and Fog: Applying a Consistent Public Duty Doctrine in 
North Carolina After Myers v. McGrady, 85 N.C.L. REV. 706, 711 (2007). 
 226. See id. at 708. 
 227. For example, a state whose constitution merely requires the legislature to provide a 
“thorough and efficient system of common schools” might be one in which the public duty doctrine 
would apply more readily than in a state whose constitution is more child-centered. 
 228. Rich, supra note 223, at 706. 
 229. See, e.g., Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 379 (N.C. 2004). 
 230. Courtney E. Nuttall, Comment, Matthews v. Pickett County: The Public Duty Doctrine and Its 
Special Duty Exception in the Face of the Governmental Tort Liabilities Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 457, 466–67 
(2000). 
 231. See id. (cataloging cases applying the doctrine to protect officers from liability when no 
special relationship between the plaintiff and the government existed: when, for example, the police 
failed to arrest a drunk driver who later injured the plaintiff). 
 232. E.g., Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 968 P.2d 522, 528 (Cal. 1998) (“The relationship 
between school personnel and students is analogous in many ways to the relationship between 
parents and their children. At common law, ‘[s]chool officials are said to stand in loco parentis, in the 
place of parents, to their students, with similar powers and responsibilities.’” (citation omitted)). 
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to them as students and not merely as citizens.233 For these reasons, although it is 
likely to be raised by defendants, the public duty doctrine should not prohibit 
students from recovering for violations of their educational rights. 
3. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Disputes regarding many of the positive rights granted by state statutes, 
such as entitlements, are initially resolved in administrative proceedings, with a 
right of appeal to a traditional state court. The administrative system serves to 
resolve disputes—especially those that are of a largely technical nature—more 
quickly and less expensively than a traditional trial and is also generally more 
accessible to the public and to self-representation. In fact, the IDEA allows states 
to establish administrative procedures to resolve IEP disputes, 234 and all states 
have done so. Administrative procedures also lessen the burdens on courts, thus 
dampening the impact on the judiciary of any potential flood of litigation. 
Currently, no administrative procedures exist for adjudicating individual claims 
of inadequate provision of education because the cause of action itself has yet to 
be recognized. There is, however, no apparent reason why educational rights 
suits could not also be handled though an administrative process if states wished 
to establish one for that purpose. Indeed, an administrative process that puts 
expert analysts to work evaluating these claims quickly may well be the best way 
to implement a system of adjudicating individual educational rights suits. 
V. WHY A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION? 
In light of the failures of the systemic approach described above, innovation 
is required if children are to realize their rights. While parts III and IV discussed 
the legal and practical aspects of a private right of action, this part explores the 
theoretical justification for the right as well as the policy rationales that support 
it. As an initial matter, I concede that it would be preferable for legislatures to 
provide solutions to the problems of inadequate education. Legislatures have, 
however, had several decades to get around to providing an adequate education 
for all children. They have not done it. There is little reason to believe that this 
will be drastically different in the future.235 If legislatures are unresponsive, and 
children have a right236 that courts can effectuate,237 it makes little sense to deny 
either the children or the courts the opportunity. After all, a right without a 
remedy is no right at all.238 
 
 233. See Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22–24 (1998) (holding that a generalized 
grievance may still confer standing on individuals who have suffered a concrete and specific injury in 
fact). 
 234. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1) (2006) (explaining the administrative hearing process). 
 235. See Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 772–78 (discussing the political market 
failures that explain why legislatures are unwilling or unable to provide adequate education for all 
children). 
 236. See infra Part V.A. 
 237. See supra Parts III.B, IV. 
 238. See, e.g., Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. 612, 623 (1849) (“A legal right without a remedy would be an 
anomaly in the law.”). 
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A. The Right to an Adequate Education Is a Personal One 
On their face, only four of the fifty state constitution education articles 
mention the quality of education to be provided.239 Indeed, more than twenty-
five percent of the state constitutions (fourteen) require only the basic 
establishment and support of a free system of public schools.240 Of the remaining 
thirty-two, about half modify the basic requirement of providing a public school 
system with adjectives such as “thorough,”241 “efficient,”242 and “uniform,”243 
whereas the others require legislatures to use “all means necessary,”244 or 
“suitable means”245 to secure for their citizens the “advantages and opportunities 
of education,”246 or to provide for the intellectual development of the people.247 
On their texts, these constitutional provisions apply mainly to the 
legislatures of the states, usually as a mandate that “the legislature shall” 
maintain a school system.248 Understanding, however, that the logical 
implication of mandating the provision of education is that those for whose 
benefit it is mandated, i.e. the children of the state, have a right to receive it, 
many courts have interpreted these provisions to grant fundamental rights to the 
children of the state.249 Despite the substantial differences in the texts of the 
constitutions and the differences in the scope of court-articulated rights, there is 
little correlation between the explicit wording and the substantive right 
recognized by a court. For example, the Illinois constitution explicitly references 
quality,250 but the Illinois Supreme Court has held that evaluating whether a 
quality education has been provided is beyond the province of the courts and 
solely for the legislature.251 Conversely, although the Wyoming Constitution only 
requires the legislature to “provide for the establishment and maintenance of a 
 
 239. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“Adequate provision shall be made by law for a . . . high quality 
system of free public schools . . . .”); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (requiring the state to provide “an efficient 
system of high quality public educational institutions and services”); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3) 
(mandating provision of “a basic system of free quality public . . . schools”); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 
(requiring the legislature to “ensure that an educational program of high quality is . . . maintained”); 
see also Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1325, 1343–48 (1992) (cataloging state constitutional provisions). 
 240. See CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. 
CONST. ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art VIII, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); 
NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; 
S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; VT. CONST. § 68. 
 241. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
 242. E.g., OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 243. E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 244. E.g., R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1. 
 245. E.g., ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 246. E.g., S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 247. E.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 248. See Hubsch, supra note 239, at 1329. 
 249. E.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 76 (Wash. 1978) (holding that the state 
constitution “imposes a paramount duty upon the State which in turn creates a correlative right on 
behalf of all children residing” in the state). 
 250. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
 251. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996). 
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complete and uniform system of public instruction,”252 the Wyoming Supreme 
Court interpreted this article as establishing a fundamental right to education253 
and applies strict scrutiny to laws impacting the right.254 Similarly, state supreme 
courts in California,255 Connecticut,256 Kentucky,257 Minnesota,258 North 
Dakota,259 West Virginia,260 and Wisconsin261 have each held that education is a 
fundamental right under their state’s constitution. In state constitutional law, as 
in federal constitutional law, infringements upon and failures to fulfill 
fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny from the courts rather than rational 
basis review.262 By extension, therefore, if the right to education is fundamental, 
the bar for proving a violation is lower.263 
The North Carolina Supreme Court has gone the furthest of the state courts 
in interpreting the right to education. The education article of the North Carolina 
constitution is of the basic variety: “The General Assembly shall provide . . . for a 
general and uniform system of free public schools.”264 Yet in 2004, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court explained: 
We read Leandro and our state Constitution, as argued by plaintiffs, as according 
the right at issue to all children of North Carolina, regardless of their respective 
ages or needs. Whether it be the infant Zoe, the toddler Riley, the preschooler 
Nathaniel, the “at-risk” middle-schooler Jerome, or the not “at-risk” seventh-
grader Louise, the constitutional right articulated in Leandro is vested in them 
all.265 
Washington has taken a similarly strong approach, labeling the right to 
education “a true ‘right’ (an absolute)” that, unlike a fundamental right, may not 
be infringed by the state—even for compelling reasons.266 
Other states have recognized a personal right to education without holding 
it to be fundamental. For example, the New York Constitution requires the bare 
minimum: “the maintenance and support of a system of free common 
schools.”267 Although the New York Court of Appeals has refused to label 
education a fundamental right,268 that court has repeatedly recognized that the 
 
 252. WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 253. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1258 (Wyo. 1995). 
 254. Id. at 1266. 
 255. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976). 
 256. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977). 
 257. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989). 
 258. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993). 
 259. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994). 
 260. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.Va. 1979). 
 261. Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000). 
 262. See, e.g., Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1266 (Wyo. 1995). 
 263. See id.; cf. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1187–88 (Kan. 1994) (noting that 
under rational basis scrutiny “the constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests 
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective”). 
 264. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2. 
 265. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 379 (N.C. 2004). 
 266. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 92 n.13 (Wash. 1978). 
 267. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 268. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 668–69 (N.Y. 1995). 
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state constitution establishes the right to an adequate education.269 Likewise, in 
Arkansas, the supreme court has repeatedly determined that while education is 
not a fundamental right, it is a constitutional right enforceable by the courts.270 
Similar situations have occurred in Alabama,271 Kansas,272 Maryland,273 
Massachusetts,274 Montana,275 Nebraska,276 New Hampshire,277 New Jersey,278 
Ohio,279 Oregon,280 South Carolina,281 Texas,282 and Vermont.283 
B. The Benefits Outweigh the Costs 
Even if a private right of action is theoretically justified, the question of 
whether it is sound policy must be answered. Although there are some 
drawbacks to recognizing a private right of action for inadequate provision of 
educational opportunity at the state level, the benefits are substantial. 
First, perhaps the strongest benefit to an individual right of action would be 
the speed with which students could receive remedies. If a child could receive a 
transfer to another school or tutoring services within a year of filing a complaint, 
 
 269. Id. at 681 (Simons, J., dissenting) (“The majority apparently view the constitutional provision 
as establishing an entitlement to receive an adequate education.”). 
 270. Lake View Sch. Dist., No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 492 (Ark. 2002) (reaffirming the 
interpretation of the education clause in a prior case). 
 271. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 139 (Ala. 1993) (holding that education not 
being a fundamental right “is no defense to a claim of constitutional infringement because individual 
rights do not obtain only when the state believes that it can afford them”). 
 272. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1189–90 (Kan. 1994) (explaining that the 
court refused to classify education as a fundamental right because of problems inhering in the strict 
scrutiny test). 
 273. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983). 
 274. McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) (holding 
that the state constitution creates a mandatory duty on the state to provide adequate education, 
which may be enforced by citizens through the courts, but declining to find a fundamental right). 
 275. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 691 (Mont. 1989) (declining to 
decide whether education is a fundamental right because the equal protection issue was not 
dispositive on appeal). 
 276. Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Neb. 1993) (White, J., dissenting in part) (indicating that 
the court had not decided whether education is a fundamental right because the plaintiff’s claim was 
not properly pleaded). 
 277. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) (labeling education “an 
important, substantive right”). 
 278. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 286 (N.J. 1973). 
 279. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 740 n.5 (Ohio 1997) (declining to decide whether education 
is a fundamental right but still declaring the state’s financing system unconstitutional). 
 280. Coal. for Equitable Sch. Funding v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 124 (Or. 1991) (discussing the positive 
nature of the right to education in Oregon). 
 281. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (holding that the state 
constitution creates a duty on the state to provide adequate education, which may be enforced by 
citizens through the courts, but declining to find a fundamental right). 
 282. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (holding the school 
financing statute unconstitutional because it was not “efficient” and declining to decide whether 
education is a fundamental right). 
 283. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 396 (Vt. 1997) (finding the state’s school funding statute to 
violate rational basis scrutiny, making a determination of whether education is a fundamental right 
unnecessary). 
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he would be substantially better off than under the status quo where he must 
wait a decade or more for some other entity to assert his rights and use new 
funds to improve his education. Also, because much of the legal legwork has 
already been accomplished in adequacy suits, individual suits should be able to 
move forward at a fairly rapid pace—the individual plaintiff will not have to 
spend years relitigating the existence of the basic right to education. 
A second and related benefit would be that such suits would place the focus 
of the law where it belongs: on children rather than on bureaucrats or nonprofit 
organizations. Although it is true that nearly all children in public school receive 
their education from school districts, the right to an adequate education does not 
belong to the district. Justice is ill-served by pretending otherwise, because even 
though this is a rhetorical nuance, rhetoric is powerful and can drive results. 
A third range of benefits are those that would accrue to students other than 
the plaintiff. Just as relatively few IDEA suits have incentivized school districts to 
provide free appropriate public education to millions of students,284 the 
constitutional suits envisioned here would serve as leverage for districts and 
states to improve educational opportunities because failure to do so would carry 
real (and very expensive) consequences. Additionally, judicial decisions ordering 
elected officials to expend public resources on politically less-powerful groups 
can be a particularly effective means of resolving the political market failures 
that give rise to the dire conditions that precipitate the litigation. The judicial 
decision provides political cover for the elected officials who can then act to 
benefit the less-powerful group without fear of electoral reprisals.285 That is, the 
court takes the heat, freeing the legislative and executive branches to solve the 
problem on the wholesale level.286 When a district replaces an unqualified 
teacher with an effective one, not only the child who initiated the suit benefits, all 
of her classmates do as well. 
The final category of benefits relates to the judicial process. First, by 
borrowing from the IDEA standards as laid out above,287 judges would have a 
ready-made set of rules on how to interpret educational claims made by students 
and districts. This would reduce the burden on the justice system for handling 
constitutional rights cases. Second and similarly, using the remedy framework of 
the IDEA promotes flexibility in resolving cases. Just as some IDEA violations 
are more severe than others, some constitutional violations are more egregious 
than others and the full range of remedies familiar to the courts under the IDEA 
offer an appropriate panoply of remedies. Finally, because these are state rights 
enforced in state courts, there are “laboratories of democracy” benefits where 
each state can learn from the experiences of its sister states to continually 
improve the implementation of this right of action. 
This plan, of course, is not without its drawbacks—most notably the cost of 
lawsuits and the limit of appropriate placements available in the market. First, 
lawsuits are a transaction cost and, as such, are economically undesirable. 
 
 284. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 285. Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance: A Cautionary Note, 25 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 37, 49 (1996). 
 286. See id. 
 287. See supra Part IV. 
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Although individual cases may not cost the millions of dollars education 
adequacy suits have, they are still likely to be expensive. Because of the upfront 
expense involved, the neediest children and their families may be unable to 
afford to take advantage of this remedy. There is also the possibility that districts 
and states will end up spending limited resources on legal rather than on 
educational services.288 The threat of expensive litigation, however, is a key 
component of the leverage that could make private suits for educational 
adequacy just as effective as IDEA suits have been. 
A critical limitation of the effectiveness of the private right of action is the 
quantity of available remedies. Spaces in high-performing public, private, and 
charter schools are limited as are available tutoring and summer school services. 
This shortage could create short-term disruptions in the ability of courts to order 
and enforce effective remedies. Comparing figures for children with disabilities 
(those served by the IDEA) and children in poverty (those most likely to be 
served by private rights of action), however, indicate that there is not much 
difference: nationally, about eleven percent of students have a diagnosed 
disability289 and about eighteen percent of children live in poverty.290 Just as not 
all children with disabilities are ill-served by their current public placements, not 
all children in poverty are ill-served either.291 
The broader benefit to the private right of action is that, in contrast to an 
across-the-board legislative solution, it provides for incremental change. It will 
take time for high-performing public and private schools to expand their 
capacity to take students who are victorious in courts, and it will take time for 
the teaching labor market to respond to higher salaries by producing higher 
quality teachers. But, by starting slowly, with a few suits a year—as will 
inevitably be the case as parents, advocates, and courts adapt to a new cause of 
action—these suits can send the appropriate signals to the labor and educational 
markets, which can then respond accordingly. Essentially, a response to the lag-
time for implementation is built into the process and the availability of remedies 
should not be a long-term issue. 
 
 288. Cf. Nanette Asimov, Extra-special Education at Public Expense, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 2006, at A1 
(cataloging numerous IDEA suits including a district’s $239,044 in legal expenses to successfully 
defend its position that the student did not require horseback riding and swimming therapies). One 
key difference between IDEA and the right to an adequate education is likely the affluence of the 
prospective plaintiffs: under IDEA many of the most expensive cases are pursued by relatively 
wealthy families seeking relatively posh private placements for their children. See id. Because 
children in high-wealth school districts where relatively wealthier families are most likely to live 
likely, although not assuredly, already receive constitutionally adequate educations, they are unlikely 
to become a large proportion of the plaintiffs the suits envisioned here. 
 289. U.S. CENSUS, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: JULY 26 (July 19, 2006), available at 
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_ 
editions/006841.html. This figure does not include children whose disabilities are not yet diagnosed. 
 290. U.S. CENSUS, AM. CMTY. SURVEY, SELECTED ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2007, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lan
g=en&_ts= (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (click on “Data Profiles”). 
 291. See DOUGLAS REEVES, ACCOUNTABILITY IN ACTION: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEARNING 
ORGANIZATIONS 185–96 (2000) (documenting “90/90/90” schools: those with 90% minority students, 
90% poor students, and 90% pass rates on state tests). 
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Some may also argue that schools are not entirely to blame for some 
children’s failure to learn; this is certainly true as numerous nonschool factors 
impact a child’s success.292 Nonschool factors like low parental involvement, 
however, will not be present in private right of action cases because only 
involved parents will bring suits, and such concerns are not significant enough to 
undercut the benefits such causes of action can bring to involved families. 
A final criticism is that the justifications outlined above are ultimately 
beside the point because courts that rely on a lack of judicially manageable 
standards293 merely do so rhetorically and have entirely distinct substantive 
reasons for their holdings. This criticism comes in two forms: first, judicial 
complaints about the lack of standards are merely cover for the true, and non-
judicial, reasons for the courts’ decisions; second, a lack of manageable standards 
is a court’s way of articulating more generalized concerns with the difficulty of 
implementing positive rights. If the former, one can only guess as to what a 
court’s true motivations might be, but the political heat of the issue and potential 
electoral repercussions are possibilities. As already noted, the fact that 
majoritarian legislatures have not already enacted policies that effectuate the 
goal of adequate education shows that such a goal is not a political priority.294 
Additionally, because nearly all state court judges face some form of electoral or 
legislative review,295 is it also logical for them to be concerned about how their 
decisions will impact their job security. There is only one response to this 
criticism: it is a judge’s job to answer to the constitution—not to the electorate—
and if a state’s constitution requires the enforcement of unpopular (and 
expensive) rights, it is the judge’s obligation to require that enforcement. If 
judges are unwilling to see themselves as different from legislatures, then our 
system of government has larger problems than inadequate education for needy 
children. 
If discussions of manageable standards stand for the latter concern 
regarding the difficulty of implementing positive rights, a court may correctly be 
wary of entering the foray of positive rights: such rights can be difficult to define, 
violations challenging to detect, and enforcement lengthy and arduous. But it 
should reassure courts that they enforce positive rights all the time, they are just 
usually in statutory rather than constitutional form. Indeed, the modern welfare 
state is brimming with positive rights such as income support for the disabled 
and the elderly,296 medical support for the poor297 and veterans,298 and rights to 
 
 292. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, CLASS AND SCHOOLS: USING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM TO CLOSE THE BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 19–45 (2004) (documenting 
non-school factors like parental involvement and access to quality health care that affect students’ 
success). 
 293. See supra Part III.B. 
 294. See Standing up to Legislative Bullies, supra note 49, at 772–78. 
 295. Id. at 766. 
 296. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (2006). 
 297. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (2006) (setting forth the eligibility and 
funding requirements of Medicaid). 
 298. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (2006) (detailing the various health and medical benefits to 
which veterans are entitled). 
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social services such as those provided in the IDEA.299 Furthermore, courts are 
successful in implementing positive constitutional rights, such as the right to 
counsel in criminal proceedings.300 Critics may complain that each of these 
examples is manageable because the right is provided only for a subset of the 
population (i.e., the disabled, the elderly, the poor, veterans, criminal defendants, 
etc.), and for logistical and financial reasons, such limitations might be necessary 
to make the rights functional. The right to an adequate education, however, is 
also demographically limited: it only applies to children, bringing it in line with 
the scope of other, well-recognized positive rights. 
In any case, by providing a response to the courts’ proffered reasoning, this 
piece seeks to move the dialogue forward. If courts can no longer rely on the lack 
of manageable standards as rhetorical cover for their decisions because that 
reasoning has been undercut, they may be more candid in the future regarding 
their true motivations, thus fostering greater dialogue among the branches of 
government and between government and the people regarding policy priorities 
and fundamental values. 
CONCLUSION 
Over two centuries, the experiment of United States public education has 
grown by leaps and bounds, served millions of students, spurred economic 
prosperity, and helped heal our cultural divisions. In the twenty-first century, 
the future of public education remains an open book as the nation is confronted 
with the hard realities of inadequacy that plague too many schools 
disproportionately populated by students of color. As in the past, the courts have 
the opportunity to push society forward and fulfill the promises of state 
constitutions by recognizing a private right of action that enforces the right to an 
adequate education. Social mobility is the engine of the American Dream, and 
education is the key to social mobility. The question is now: will every child be 
given a key? 
 
 
 299. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2006). 
 300. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1962) (holding that the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution requires defendants be provided with counsel in felony proceedings). 
